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  ABSTRACT: 
Asymmetric election has been discussed as an alternative for Indonesia model of election 
considering the massive problems of current simultaneous election. Having a large 
population, huge number of voters, disparities of island geographic obstacles along with 
strong decentralization of government endorsement then political decentralization 
must run side by side to support each other for social accountability and public services. 
Starfish’s concept of decentralization model could be best describing the necessity of 
having asym metric elections where local voices matter. All politics is local is an important 
issue at the national level where the way of electoral system must be coherent. The paper 
argues that elections at the national level must be separated from DPR and DPD and 
Presidential election alone to put respect at the national leader as well as a call for public 
attention in their candidacy. Focusing on the Presidential election alone ignoring DPR, 
DPD and DPRD only result not only degradation of democracy but also morality. At the 
local level an election should be held for DPRD members and the Head of Region election. 
This could emphasize local issues where local people need to think and put more 
attention on their representatives who are going to voice their interests on local 
regulations. 
Keywords: asymmetric election, political decentralization, simultaneously elec tion 
 
ABSTRAK: 
Pemilihan asimetris telah dibahas sebagai salah satu alternatif model pemilihan di 
Indonesia mengingat masifnya permasalahan pemilu serentak saat ini. Dengan jumlah 
penduduk yang besar, jumlah pemilih yang besar, disparitas hambatan geografis 
pulau disertai desentralisasi yang kuat dari dukungan pemerintah maka desentralisasi 
politik harus berjalan beriringan untuk saling mendukung untuk akuntabilitas sosial dan 
pelayanan publik. Konsep model desentralisasi Starfish paling tepat menggambarkan 
perlunya pemilihan asimetris di mana suara lokal penting. Semua politik lokal 
merupakan isu penting di tingkat nasional di mana cara sistem pemilu harus koheren. 
Makalah ini berpendapat bahwa pemilihan di tingkat nasional harus dipisahkan dari 
DPR dan DPD dan pemilihan Presiden saja untuk menghormati pemimpin nasional 
serta meminta perhatian publik dalam pencalonannya. Fokus pada Pilpres saja 
mengabaikan DPR, DPD dan DPRD hanya mengakibatkan tidak hanya degradasi 
demokrasi tetapi juga moralitas. Di tingkat daerah harus diadakan pemilihan anggota 
DPRD dan pemilihan Kepala Daerah. Hal ini dapat menekankan isu-isu lokal di mana 
masyarakat lokal perlu berpikir dan lebih memperhatikan perwakilan mereka yang 
akan menyuarakan kepentingan mereka pada peraturan daerah. 
 






























































Indonesia just passed the simultaneous General 
Elec- tion on April 17, 2019, which was the first election 
to elect a President, The House of Representative (DPR), 
Regional Representative Council (DPD), District House of 
Representatives (Lay, 2001). The decision to set up a 
simultaneous electoral system is based on a variety of fac 
tors. Quoting IDEA 2016 on the option of an electoral 
system in a country, it is a decision to modify or retain an 
electoral system where two dominant conditions are 
affecting 1) political actors do not have basic knowledge 
and information so that various system choices and 
consequences-different electoral systems are not fully 
understood; and, 2) on the contrary, political actors are not 
fully understood (Tauda, 2018). 
The alternative of a parallel election system is the 
judicial re- view of Effendi Ghazali, along with the Group 
Coalition for Concurrent Elections, which sued Law No. 
42/2008 on Presi- dential Elections to the Constitutional 
Court (MK) (Sahbani, 2014). The explanation given is that 
simultaneous elections are more effective in terms of both 
time and expense, based on the estimates of the members 
of the KPU at the time, Ferry Kurnia Rizkiyansyah, which 
they quoted in the application, holding a simultaneous 
election could save the budget from Rp 5 to Rp 10 trillion 
(Fajri, 2016). Based on the calculations of the DPR Mem- 
bers of the F-PDIP Arif Wibowo, a simultaneous election 
would save around Rp 150 trillion in funds or one-tenth 
of the na- tional budget and the regional budget. 
Continuing the simulta- neous regional election argument 
according to the Constitutional Court was to reduce waste 
of time and reduce horizontal con- flict or friction in the 
community (Saputra, 2019).










The fact of the simultaneous elections April 17 2019 is 
that the Indonesian people elect the Vice President, Member of 
the Republic of Indonesia Parliament, Provincial DPRD 
Members, Regency / City DPRD Members, DPD Members, 
followed by 2 presidential and vice presidential candidates; 16 
political parties; 4 local Aceh political parties; four new political 
parties (Indone- sian Solidarity Party (PSI), Indonesian Unity 
Party (Perindo), Working Party, and Indonesia (Garuda) Change 
Movement Party; 575 members of the Indonesian Parliament; 136 
DPD members; 2,207 Provincial DPR members and 17,610 
members City / Re- gency DPRD with 185,732,093 Permanent 
Voters List (DPT) totaling 92,802,671 male voters and 
92,929,422 female voters (Yudhistira, 2019). They came at polling 
stations totaling 805,075. The total funds were Rp. 25.59 trillion. 
Indonesian elections were the largest. third in the world after 
India and the United States, following Brazil and Russia, but these 
countries with a large number of voters have applied minimal 
technology, fast counting machines and not manual counting 
(Saputra, 2019). 
The number of voters and 5 (five) options among the 
many names on the ballot makes it difficult for the voters to 
know exactly who will be chosen. According to data from the 
Central Bureau of Statistics in 2018, the illiterate population was 
3,387,035 or 2,07 percent of the total population of Indonesia 
aged 15-59 years, in which some citizens had the right to vote 
with or parents who could no longer read more encountered 
uncertainty to decide who the candidate will be selected. Not to 
mention in this referendum, mad people still have the same right to 
vote as ordinary people (Bayhaqi, 2018). 
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While the fundamen- tal concept of democracy is that people 
have the right to select the leaders, they think with common 
sense to represent their interests in public policymaking, people 
recognize who will be elected and accountable for representing 
their lives in the form of policy alignments in legislation or 
regional legislation. Public interest in legislative candidates is very 
limited since the people’s energy and interest is concentrated 
exclusively on the figure of the presidential candidate pair. While 
legislative representatives are very effective in shaping people’s 
policies, both in central and regional governments. This agency 
is the counterpart of the President in the development of human 
welfare legislation. In the same way, at the provincial and 
district/city level, the DPRD becomes a joint partner of the 
regional head in formulating lo- cal regulations for the local 
community (Dick-Sagoe, 2020). 
Simultaneous selection not only rejected the concept of de- 
\scentralization of government, which had been reinforced 
three times during the reform era since 1999, 2004, and 2014 
but also overlooked the distinctive character of each region of 
Indonesia and the varied geographical conditions of the largest 
archipelago in the world. Simultaneous elections were the 
fatalities of de- mocracy that killed the KPPS, who were 
fatigued from counting five ballots depending on their tasks 
(Medistiara, 2019). 
These election victims arise because the simultaneous election 
submissions are not accompanied by appropriate studies on the 
size of the area and large manual counting, pressures, and 
demands of election contestants, the reactions of witnesses and 
observers, and data inputs that are still very susceptible to 
manipulation









As of Tues- day, April 22, 2019, KPPS officers who died 119 
and 548 who were ill were spread in 19 provinces due to 
exhaustion and the duty to oversee the counting of ballots 
(Ryan, 2019). 
Finally, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court acknowl- 
edged that he was guilty of agreeing to the simultaneous General  
Election, which created huge and huge complexity (Rahmad, 
2019). The question of the transparency of the election manag- 
ers and the lack of honest and equal values felt by the commu- 
nity with the number of ballot boxes burned, thousands of bal- 
lots found in wrong locations, and thousands of votes cast to win 
candidates, including KPPS officers who cast illegal ballots, were 
part of the fact that the simultaneous elections in 2017 were be- 
ing held (Almunanda, 2019). 
Various problems of simultaneous elections lead to thoughts 
and evaluations to produce representative, accountable, honest, 
and fair elections. Such thinking is usually based on how the 
electoral system converts votes to seats won by parties and candi- 
dates. In addition to the variable formulation of elections used 
(i.e., whether a plurality/majority system, proportional, mixed, 
or other systems are used, and what mathematical formulation 
is used to calculate seat allocation), the voting structure (i.e. the 
voter chooses a candidate or a party and whether the voter makes 
a single choice or reveals a series of preferences) and the size of 
the electoral district (not how many voters live in an electoral 
district, but how many representatives.) Somehow, the decen- 
tralization process of government, which led to political decen- 
tralization is to distinguish the domains of the central govern- 
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225 ment and local governments’ election. The concept of Asym- 
metric Election is elections that distinguish between regions de- 
pending on the specificity of the area. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
ASYMMETRIC ELECTION AND POLITICAL DECENTRALI- 
ZATION 
Elections are one of the conditions of a democratic country 
where citizens have the right to decide the leader, whether to 
maintain the regime or change the regime, to nominate their 
representative representatives at the state, regional, and district 
levels (Salahudin et al., 2020). The nature of good governance in 
the theory of democracy is the presence of a leader of integrity, 
openness, and integrity in all policies adopted (Ulfa et al., 2020). 
It is therefore very important to devise an electoral framework 
that takes people closer to their leaders not only once every five 
years, but a mechanism that is capable of sustaining and sticking  
leadership policies to people’s needs. In the government’s de- 
centralization regime, democratic decentralization has an asym- 
metric election model where the electoral system does not have 
to be the same as the national system. In other words, the elec- 
tion of national leaders is differentiated by the election of local 
leaders (Rahmat & Purnomo, 2020). 
Indonesia has acknowledged asymmetrical elections, in which 
elections take place differently in a country according to the com- 
plexity and complexity of the region (Nurdin, 2012). Four re- 
gions in Indonesia accept asymmetrical elections based on varia- 
tions in the characteristics of government, community, political,  
and socio-economic conditions. The four provinces with asym- 
metric decentralization are Jakarta as the capital of Indonesia, 
Jogyakarta as kingdom heritage, Papua as economic development 
delayed and Aceh as political reason. Since the decentralization of 
government was strongly expressed in 1999, three years later,  
after constitutional decentralization, Papua accepted the asym- 
metrical form of elections using the Noken scheme (Law No. 21 








of 2001 Otsus Papua) (Wahidin et al., 2020). Voting in Papua, 
the absence of a gubernatorial election in the Special Province of 
Yogyakarta, no election of the City District took place in Jakarta  
(2007) as well as the presence of local political parties in Nanggroe 
Aceh Darussalam (NAD, Law No. 11 the Year 2006) (Zahra et 
al., 2020). This asymmetrical model takes place in an asymmetri- 
cal democracy that is known by the world. 
Decentralization of government that has been arranged in such 
a way that local communities can determine their own regional 
leaders must be in line with political decentralization. The legal  
basis for asymmetric elections has been stated in the amendments 
to the 1945 Constitution Article 18A paragraph (1), Article 18B 
paragraph (1) and (2) of the 1945 Constitution. In Article 18A 
paragraph (1) mandated that “Relations of authority between 
the central government and provincial government, regencies and 
cities, regulated by law by taking into account the specificity and  
diversity of regions.’’ Furthermore, in Article 18B paragraphs (1) 
and (2) it is stipulated that (1) the State recognizes and respects 
special or special regional government units regulated in law. (2)  
The State recognizes and respects the customary law community 
units along with their traditional rights insofar as they are still 
alive and in accordance with the development of society and the  
principles of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, which are regu- 
lated in the Constitution. At least political decentralization has 
continued by politically asymmetric elections in Aceh and Papua 
that has three similarities, first, the authority to form local politi- 
cal parties; second, governance arrangements through special local 
regulations and thirdly, leadership arrangements must be 
indegenous people from both provinces (Tauda, 2018). 
Political decentralization is intended to bring local people 
closer to their regional leaders, not only regional heads but also 
Regional People’s Representative Council of the Republic of 
Indonesia (RPRC RI) /Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah 
Republik Indonesia (DPRD RI) members (Dick-Sagoe, 2020). 
So far, attention has only been given to the regional head as a 
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227 single leader and forgetting the roles of the DPRD as a counter- 
part to have a balance of power in order local government could 
produce asymmetric policies that are typically regional. Asym- 
metric elections are a way to bring the elected representatives 
closer together and strengthen election control by the 
people (Aylott & Bolin, 2019). National conflicts do not affect 
local life, including policies that only benefit national political 
interests and harm local communities. For example, the import 
policy of rice, maize, and agricultural products decided by the 
central government ultimately harmed the farming community, 
and should be balanced by the decision of the regional head and  
the DPRD to protect the agricultural products of its citizens. 
Then, what about 30 other provinces in Indonesia that do 
not have asymmetrical decentralization, if asymmetrical elections 
can still be held? If the concept of well-being and the needs of 
the local community are the concern of democracy holders, an 
election mechanism that can keep the voice of the people rel- 
evant for the good of the people should be an important option. 
The democratic paradigm cannot be allowed to disregard the 
voices of the people on an ongoing basis and to spend a very 
large amount of money only to occupy people who are not re- 
sponsible for the people who chose them (Haryanto, 2016). 
The removal of the Mandaling Natal Regent, Mr. Dahlan, 
because of his dissatisfaction that his local group did not prefer 
Jokowi or did not succeed in winning Jokowi in his territory, 
became a “shame warning” showing how our election did not 
put local leaders closer to their communities (Wismabrata, 2019). 
Community leaders should concentrate on fulfilling the vision 
of the campaign and the mission goals that have made the people  
vote for them in the District Head of Elections. Two very critical  
things happen, 1) the misunderstanding of the people’s right to 
vote for the President (one person one vote) and not relevant to 
the Regent, 2) the disregard of the people’s vote to be taken by 
the Regent leader simply because he focuses on national leader- 
ship, not the citizens who voted for him (Oscar, 2019). Attention 








to national elections alienates the regional cultures that elected 
representatives have expressed in their areas. The electoral sys- 
tem must be evaluated to strengthen local and national democ- 
racy to realize the objectives of substantive democracy, not pro- 
cedural. 
In fact, the idea of an Asymmetrical Election discussed at 
the 5th Constitutional Law Conference in November 2018 has 
provided a factual argument that took place in the community 
because it denied the diversity that exists in the country (Fajri, 
2016). Direct and forced regional elections will produce horizon- 
tal conflicts that hinder development due to the politicization of 
the bureaucracy and the politicization of the budget which tends 
to make the implementation of regional elections not neutral 
and full of money politics. 
The reason for the simultaneous election to save costs turned 
out to be unfounded. The simultaneous election costs of 2019 
are 25.59 Trillion (T) rupiah. Based on data from the Ministry 
of Finance in 2014 and 2019, the costs of simultaneous elections 
in 2019 for the delivery of only Rp. 25.59 T (Rosadi, 2019). This 
fee does not include supervision fees (IDR 4.85 T) and security  
(IDR 3.29T) so the total cost is IDR 33.73 T. The budget alloca- 
tion for security and supervision in the 2019 elections also in- 
creased wherein the 2014 election funds for security only amount- 
ing to 1.7 trillion then in 2019 it rose to 3.29 trillion. Ballot 
boxes that cause problems in various places also increase trans- 
portation costs in the area due to the difficulty of terrain through 
rivers or waters in the territory of Indonesia. In addition, funds 
for supervision rose by 1.18 trillion, from 3.67 trillion to 4.38 
trillion based on data from the election commission planning 
data bureau (Sucipto, 2019). Unfortunately, this additional fund- 
ing is still spinning conventional elections without a solution to  
using fast counting technology like in the Philippines. They don’t 
need a quick count, because the ballot counting machine works 
thousands of ballots in minutes. While the 2014 elections which 
were preceded by legislative elections (People’s Representative 
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229 Council (DPR), Regional Representative Council (DPD), Re- 
gional People’s Representative Council (DPRD) and the Presi- 
dential election spent the state budget of Rp. 24.1T. Compari- 
son of Rp. 24.1 T in 2014 and Rp.33.73 T in 2019 shows that 
simultaneous election was cheaper not to be proven. 
 
ASYMMETRIC ELECTIONS AND DECENTRALIZATION OF 
GOVERNMENT 
The centralization of politics and the decentralization of gov- 
ernment have taken different directions. Decentralization of the 
government as a model for the division of power in the United 
States seeks to make the people prosperous and to listen to the 
voices of the people in any policy-making process (Palermo, 2020). 
The desire to offer services to the population so that decentrali- 
zation can be welcomed with joy. Unfortunately, the target would 
be stagnant without being followed by democratic decentraliza- 
tion. Asymmetric elections are a model of democratic decentrali- 
zation elections. Asymmetrical elections are on two sides, first as 
a price and respect of locality that differs from other places, this 
can be seen as an opportunity to have local people’s voices heard; 
second as a way out to be more focused in two layers of election, 
national levels and local level. In addition, political parties as 
agents of reform, with prospective representatives in both the 
executive and legislative regions concentrating mostly on work- 
ing for their constituents will have more space and policy’s en- 
dorsement based on local needs. 
Political decentralization through the division of national elec- 
tions, DPR dan DPD that are separate from the election of pre- 
presidents and local elections (provincial, regency/city DPRDs,  
and municipal leaders) would shift the political constellation to 
make it more relevant to the people. At least three elements, 
namely Individuals, Policy and Resources, will be decentralized 
and will no longer be a central monopoly (Dick-Sagoe, 2020). 
The effect of lack of democratic decentralization can be seen in 
the practice of democratic centralization, through the predomi- 








nance of the role of political party elites in deciding the country’s 
regional leaders and national leaders. Leaders of regional elec- 
tions (DPRD and province/district leaders) and national elec- 
tions (presidential, DPR dan DPD elections) are expected to ac- 
celerate the welfare of the people as expected by the Reforma- 
tion in 1998 (Nurdin, 2012). This is compounded by the hold- 
ing of simultaneous elections, which draw the attention of frag- 
mented regions to top-level elections. 
The centralization of politics was strengthened with simulta- 
neous elections so that political decentralization as the entrance 
door for Person, Policy and Money had not yet occurred. One of  
the causes of the stagnant goal of government decentralization 
for welfare is the still-centralized political stagnation of power, 
the dominant party that imposes the will on regional heads, and 
regional heads who tend to only obey the orders of party leaders  
and ignore the voices of the people. 
 
ASYMMETRIC ELECTIONS PREVENT CENTRALIZATION 
OF POLITICS 
Asymmetrical elections can at least prevent political central- 
ization carried out by political parties if human resources, poli- 
cies, and money are still monopolized by the management of 
political parties at the central level and not handed over to the 
region or the Branch Management Board (DPC) (Nurdin, 2012). 
“All politics local”embedded in asymmetric elections because local 
voices would be heard strongly, political parties must have local  
preference instead of national elites’ along with policy and deci- 
sion making processes that are supposedly closer to local people. 
Further, the attention of the community will be more focused 
on the electability of regional heads and members of the DPRD. 
This condition will encourage the strengthening of political party 
management at the regional level. Asymmetric elections will cer- 
tainly be in line with political decentralization because there is a  
transfer of responsibility for planning and management affairs 
in increasing allocation and resources from the center to the re- 
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231 gion. While the implementation of simultaneous elections will 
only encourage the centralization of politics where people’s at- 
tention is no longer focused on the electability of their regional 
leaders who influence the livelihoods of local communities 
(Khamdan & Wiharyani, 2018). 
 
METHOD 
The research used a qualitative method with a descriptive 
approach. The qualitative descriptive approach uses non-quanti- 
tative data collection and interpretation, which attempts to ana- 
lyze social interactions, processes, or incidents by presenting con- 
text information on the topic in question. In this case, this ar- 
ticle discusses the relationship between the simultaneous selec- 
tion and the outcome of the simultaneous election. Using the 
idea of decentralized starfish in the selection process shows that  
selection with an asymmetric model is important so the public 
will learn more about their future leader (Brafman & Beckstrom, 
2008). The monitoring of the democratic standard of the elec- 
toral process carried out by the group will get to know more closely 
and better understand the character of their representatives. Data 
from primary and secondary sources, while the first is obtained 
from data from the KPU, Bawaslu, election guard, and website 
as well as secondary data from books, journals, and mass media 
articles related to the topics discussed. Data analysis uses the- 
matic analysis which emphasizes the position of ideas in the 
material under study. 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
ALL POLITICS IS LOCAL 
Local concerns must not only color local policies but also 
national policies in governments that have made decentraliza- 
tion a reality. For example, food imports by the central govern- 
ment (rice, onions, fruit) could result in regional heads being 
rejected by the DPRD if farmers in their area have to lose be- 
cause their harvests would be disrupted by sales. The DPR must 








convey this at the national level since they are also elected to 
represent the people at the level of the central government 
(Nurdin, 2012). Unfortunately, this is far from reality. Not only 
because our election always focuses on selecting candidates, but  
also on overlooking the legitimacy of the people’s representa- 
tives and leaders to listen to their people. Political parties as agents 
of reform are often degraded only by the centralized role of po- 
litical recruitment. Indonesian political parties have shown a ten- 
dency to be centralized and hierarchical as a consequence of the  
once-powerful position of the central government. 
Democracy should preserve the spirit of the interests of the 
local community, as articulated by the national elite, in the In- 
donesian party policy-making structure. “All the politics are lo- 
cal”. Ideally, whatever decisions are made at the central level, the 
interests of the electorate in the electoral district are the basis for  
those decisions (Gelman, 2011). “All politics is local ‘’ is about 
democratic decentralization, which seeks to give voters or their 
representatives the power to make policy decisions in their elec- 
toral districts. In the case of Obama’s HealthCare Reform, some  
members of the Congress of the Democratic Party opposed the 
program, their rationale was, “I am elected by my constituent, 
not by the President” meaning that members of the Congress of 
the Party holding the President will oppose the policy (policy) of  
the President if his constituency rejects it (Nurdin, 2012). 
Asymmetrical elections at least avoid the centralization of 
political parties that can shape and undermine government if 
they are determined only by the central players in the entire pro- 
cess of an individual, policy, and resources (Laver & Shepsle, 
1996). The position of political parties should not be at the na- 
tional level, but also at the local level (DPD, DPC). This indi- 
cates that there is a framework for alternatives to mitigate the 
inefficiency of political parties through the decentralization of 
the administrative structure of the state. His statement focuses 
on two aspects of the party system: 1) the distribution of partisan  
allegiance between central and regional governments, and 2) the 
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233 propensity of local officials to express local interests (Haryanto et 
al., 2019). The asymmetry election enabled the voices of local 
people to be heard in the elections. People will be able to get to 
know their representatives more closely and to make the DPRD 
more transparent and modern in policy-making so that people 
at the same time know what is being debated at the local govern- 
ment level for the good of the local community. 
 
THE CONCEPT OF STARFISH AND SPIDER WEB ORGA- 
NIZING ASYMMETRICAL ELECTIONS 
Asymmetrical elections offer opportunities for local popula- 
tions to select more carefully on the basis of their background 
and knowledge of their candidate representatives. This is in line  
with political decentralization, which seeks to increase the differ- 
ent competencies of the mechanism, namely to build possibili- 
ties or possibilities for the selection of independent candidates 
who are able to demonstrate their capacity to lead and develop 
local electoral skills in order to boost the standard of local 
policymaking. 
This asymmetrical election analysis can be comparable to of- 
fering regions and their populations the opportunity to consider 
their leaders more closely through the authority to have the op- 
portunity to select differently from central-level leaders. The defi- 
nition of Starfish by Ori Brafman and Rod Backstrom or Star- 
fish is an analogy that can be used that focuses on regional prob- 
lems provided to regions to promote problem-solving in regions 
rather than centrally controlled, including the holding of simul- 
taneous elections (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2008). This conduct 
of the animal is rather autonomous as a living organization. If 
one arm is removed, a new arm can develop without a central 
system command, since the nervous system is very powerful up to 
five (or more) arms. Although having the election at the same time 
is similar to a spider if the head is injured, it will die be- cause 
the nervous system is concentrated and there is no power in 
other parts of the body to solve the issue. This decentralized 








starfish model has also been used in military structures that are 
considered to be very hierarchical. In order to improve the imple- 
mentation of the regional government, the asymmetric election 
model offers a range of advantages, such as the idea of starfish 
models: 
1. The issue of representation of candidates for DPRD mem- 
bers, regional heads, policies and budgets can be handled more 
quickly at the local level rather than waiting for central or- 
ders. A decentralized organizing organization tends to be more 
open 
2. When the Person, policy and Money are the responsibility of 
the whole level of government not only in the center but also 
in the region (including the DPC or DPD party administra- 
tors), the level of intelligence in solving problems becomes 
fast because there is no central system or problem solving Gov- 
ernments or political parties that only have a centralized sys- 
tem of brain / intelligence / intelligence, it will be difficult to  
find a quick solution because the thoughts and decisions are 
far from the root of the problem. If there is a rejection of the 
candidate pair chosen and approved by the Chairperson and 
the central Management, then the regional administrators are 
better able to see the causes of rejection and solutions rather 
than waiting for central thoughts and policies. 
3. If political parties or the government are decentralized, local  
administrators (DPCs or DPDs) or Local Governments can 
respond more quickly because each member has access to 
knowledge and ability to directly utilize their resources (per- 
son, policy and money). If there is an error in the policy, the 
open and decentralized system changes and fixes it faster. 
Decentralization facilitates environmental decision-making 
and adaptation, there is no power in the hands of one person 
but all parties are responsible. 
4. The main principle in starfish is that this open system makes 
all parts of society want to contribute to the system. This is 
democracy, if people want prosperity, then the contribution 
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235 of citizens is important to support development programs that 
come from citizen participation in economic policy making 
for example. This asymmetrical model encourages citizens to 
be more enthusiastic about contributing either as volunteers 
or party donors because of a sense of belonging. 
 
Conversely, the simultaneous election model appears to ne- 
glect local issues such as the liability of the KPU and Bawaslu, 
which are so great that they are vulnerable to seeing the whole 
problem, the distribution of votes dispersed in other regions; 
the handling of slow electoral disputes, election monitoring, the  
availability of witnesses, monetary policy, the allocation of funds, 
etc. Like a spider conducting an election simultaneously enough 
to undermine the KPU (command/nerve center) and its server, 
it can quickly turn off the entire electoral mechanism. Organiz- 
ing a spider-like entity is enough to destroy the head and the 
network at a lower level will not be motivated. This is due to 
three properties that are possessed, namely: the nature of hierar- 
chy, the command and centralization system that is owned so 
that if the nerve center dies or does not function, then the whole 
system in the organization’s body dies. Meanwhile, the nature of 
starfish, headless, even severed arms can still grow new starfish.  
This is due to the 6 properties possessed, namely: the leader is 
only a catalyst; there is no chain of command; decentralization, 
open systems, divided responsibilities; and the interest and en- 
thusiasm. The asymmetric electoral system in the starfish con- 
cept can be interpreted as: 
1. Solid circle in one unit of EMB organization 
2. As a catalyst center, the center is only a rule provider to run 
to the lower levels, 
3. The center as a source of ideology to be implemented at the 
lower level, 
4. Networking under existing conditions 
5. Champion, meaning asymmetric elections have the purpose 
of winning the hearts of the people. 








Since the asymmetric electoral system is in line with decen- 
tralization to ensure that people’s voices are closer to people’s 
policymaking, it is very important to calculate the indicators of 
asymmetric elections in order to avoid the birth of small kings in  
the administration of elections that can only lead to weak gover- 
nance and local oligarchy in the political parties (Dishnica, 2015). 
For example, law enforcement in the political party system must 
be assumed to be equal, and anybody joining the regional gov- 
ernment and managing the political parties at the regional level  
does not form a new system but is subject to negotiated rules 
and application. These indicators can be seen in three joints: 
financial decentralization (central, local, regional) including open- 
ness to revenue and expenditure; acceptance of decentralization;  
and division of political divisions (Thomas, 2008). 
 
ELECTION SOLUTIONS BASED ON POLITICAL DECEN- 
TRALIZATION 
Asymmetrical elections based on the principle of decentrali- 
zation of government actually divide representatives at national  
and local levels. This model clearly rejects the electoral system 
simultaneously because it distracts from local issues and makes 
local leaders listen more to the direction of the Center than the 
votes of the people who vote. The decreasing public confidence 
in the implementation of simultaneous elections that have just 
been held has resulted in a lack of public confidence in the elec- 
tion and elected government, not to mention the election costs 
which apparently did not save as the initial assumptions. The fall  
of the helpless KPPS victims, whether they are victims of life or 
illness or become an instrument for politicians. Asymmetric elec- 
tions will force political party officials to be more qualified and 
have integrity in determining regional head candidates and DPRD 
members. Of course, the transfer of resources from the center to 
the local has consequences for the national party. Political par- 
ties are increasingly becoming a challenge in this system. The 
effect of asymmetric elections depends on political and economic 
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237 incentives in public services, in other words, Person, Policy and 
Money are determinants of success (Frendreis & Gitelson, 1994). 
However, maintaining simultaneous elections could be due to 
the need for patronage of political parties that function to main- 
tain active organizations, political party cohesion, attract voters 
and support, finance parties and candidates and create party dis- 
cipline in policy making. 
It’s just that this situation seems paradoxical for a culture that  
is increasingly transparent and calls for democratic transparency. 
Government and political parties, and the holding of elections 
that are concentrated without public correction, would give birth 
to a government that only represents itself. Not to mention the 
extent of conducting elections that are still very manual without  
moving to technology that further ensures integrity and speed of 
counting in elections. If Indonesia adopts a developing political 
system in the world, then at least two main dimensions that 
fundamentally influence the distribution of power in a society, 
namely democracy and decentralization. Political decentraliza- 
tion requires constitutional or legislative reforms, the develop- 
ment of multiple political parties, legislative strengthening, the 
creation of local political units, and effective public interest 
groups. 
One solution to political decentralization is by conducting 
multilevel asymmetric elections, in regional governments to elect 
Regional Heads, Provincial DPRDs and Regency / City DPRDs 
as well as the central government level, namely the election of 
DPR and DPD members with attention to presidential elections 
after the DPR and DPD elections. The president is a symbol of 
the State that represents the State as well as giving awards to 
government power holders who are responsible for 250 million 
people according to the constitution and avoiding problems re- 
lated to priority imbalances or broken people’s concentration 
between choosing the executive in this case the president and 
the legislature. both institutions are truly born of the best choices 
of the people. 









Asymmetric elections are the choice for the Indonesian gov- 
ernment which continues to strengthen the decentralization of 
government. Without political decentralization whose model with 
the holding of separate elections, national and central levels, 
would certainly be a paradox in building democracy for prosper- 
ity; where decentralization aims to bring community service (bot- 
tom up policy) closer to the government but on the other hand 
the holding of elections simultaneously alienates local issues and 
finally political party policies remain in the top down policy where 
the policies of the ruling elite political parties are very domi- 
nant. All politics is local and has not become a principle in si- 
multaneous elections. Asymmetric elections as a political party 
decentralization model is a necessity to accelerate people’s wel- 
fare to be in line with the government’s decentralization goals. 
The solution to the problem of simultaneous elections is the 
need for political decentralization and the use of fast-paced tech- 
nology with election models that bring people closer to their 
local governments, as well as to increase accountability and re- 
sponsiveness. The implementation of decentralized governance  
must be in line with political decentralization. At least the re- 
gional administrators were given space for different attitudes and 
choices because they had to follow the dynamics of the local poli- 
tics of their citizens. This can only be realized through a change 
in the Political Law which gives an opportunity to elected re- 
gional heads to carry out development programs and commu- 
nity welfare without having to be burdened with paying debts 
due to the high cost of elections or dowry fees in representation.  
On the other hand, giving special attention to the election of the 
President and members of the DPR and DPD will certainly in- 
crease the critical level and attention of the community because 
after all in a unitary state, the central government’s decision is 
hierarchy to the regional government. Election implementation 
must implement the policy of All Politics is local where asym- 
metrical elections are expected to encourage the formation of 
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239 political infrastructure for the integration and mobilization of 
citizens, articulation and aggregation of interests of citizens, po- 
litical policy formulation based on the interests of citizens, re- 
cruitment of political leaders based on merit not money. Asym- 
metric electoral management is no longer the dominance of the 
central government but in which the regional government be- 
comes a nerve system. Asymmetric elections can also encourage 
parties to no longer belong to the elite of political parties but the 
people so that the political party managers who sit in the politi- 
cal parties function to raise such political parties including find- 
ing the best cadres and promoting them to the people. The theo- 
retical concept of Starfish in Indonesian style should be applied to 
the Indonesian electoral system model. This Public Trust is the 
main capital of development. Law Enforcement is the main 
requirement that can be realized with the indicator of the occur- 
rence of financial decentralization (Central, Provincial, Regency 
/ City), transparency in income and expenditure, recognition of 
decentralization and clear division of political party and govern- 
mental duties. 
Starfish in asymmetric elections is needed so that the DPC / 
DPD has authority in the area to heal itself. In order for the 
democratization process to be able to prosper the people, the 
decentralization of political parties (asymmetric elections) and 
decentralization of government must co-exist with characteris- 
tics: guarantee free and fair elections, decentralize power and 
resources for local communities appropriately, protect judicial 
independence and access to justice, guarantee apparatuses’ func- 
tions effectively and is not used as a political machine, ensuring 
the separation of power between political parties as a political 
infrastructure is not a superstructure of government, protects 
access to information and media independence, protects human 
rights, business freedom, in pursuing a democratic economic 
policy. 
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